



Regulating Exclusions? Gender, Development, and the Limits of 
Inclusionary Financial Platforms  
 
Abstract  
Digital financial inclusion platforms have gained increasing attention as instruments for 
economic growth which also contribute to development goals such as poverty reduction and 
gender equality. One of the most acclaimed digital financial platforms to date is M-Pesa (M 
for mobile, pesa, Swahili for money) in Kenya, a mobile-phone-enabled money transfer service 
realised via a public-private partnership between the UK’s Department for International 
Development, Vodafone and its local partner Safaricom. Since its launch in 2007 M-Pesa has 
grown at a phenomenal rate and it is now used by over 70 per cent of the Kenyan population. 
Bringing together socio-legal enquiry, feminist political economy analysis and postcolonial 
literature, this paper discusses M-Pesa’s inclusionary regulatory arrangements and examines 
their implications for gender equality. It shows that while these arrangements contribute to 
including women in the formal financial system, they fail to adopt the redistributive measures 
necessary to address the gendered socio-economic disadvantages that cause and reproduce 
financial exclusion.  
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Financial inclusion is a key feature of the global development project and is promoted as an 
instrument for sustainable growth contributing to attaining to the United Nations’ (UN) 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).1 International organisations, governments, donors 
and corporations increasingly acclaim the use of digital platforms for facilitating access to 
formal financial services, particularly in countries of the Global South with limited 
infrastructure and resources. For instance the G20 Principles for Innovative Financial 
Inclusion, adopted following the 2008 financial crisis, strongly support the idea of financial 
innovation through new forms of financial service delivery that are capable of reaching the 
excluded via routes such as branchless banking and payment services available through postal 
and retail outlets and shops.2 Such digital financial platforms rely on institutional arrangements 
between different actors and offer those excluded from the mainstream banking infrastructure 
affordable and secure access to formal financial services. 
One of the most-discussed digital financial inclusion platforms to date is Kenya’s M-Pesa, a 
mobile-phone-enabled money transfer system established via a public-private partnership 
between the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), Vodafone, and 
Vodafone’s local partner Safaricom. Since its launch in 2007 M-Pesa has grown at a 
phenomenal rate to reach over 70 per cent of the Kenyan population across the geographical, 
socio-economic and gender divides.3 A key element in this rapid expansion has been the 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)’s ‘test and learn’ approach to its regulation, adopted to supervise 
                                                        
1 The SDGs are a set of human development goals supported by specific targets and indicators, to be achieved 
through global cooperation. They replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were adopted in 
2000 with the failed aim of attaining them by 2015. The post-2015 development agenda, building on the MDGs, 
led to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015 with the aim of achieving them by 2030. See General Assembly, 
Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1, 21 October 2015. 
2 See G20 Innovative Financial Inclusion Expert Group, Innovative Financial Inclusion: Principles and Report 
on Innovative Financial Inclusion from the Access through Innovation Sub-group of the G20 Financial 
Inclusion Expert Group, 2010. 
<https://www.gpfi.org/sites/gpfi/files/documents/Principles%20and%20Report%20on%20Innovative%20Finan
cial%20Inclusion_0.pdf> accessed 29 April 2019. 
3 See S. Di Castri and L. Gidvani, The Kenyan Journey to Digital Financial Inclusion, GSMA, July 2013 
<http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MMU-Infographic-The-Kenyan-
journey-to-digital-financial-inclusion.pdf > accessed 30 April 2019.  
According to Safaricom’s 2018 Annual Report M-Pesa currently has 20.5 million active customers 





the platform while remaining open to new providers and products. This approach has been 
acclaimed as a successful regulatory practice for digital financial inclusion.4  
This article examines the role of regulation in the development of digital financial inclusion 
platforms by focusing on the case of M-Pesa in Kenya. Bridging socio-legal enquiry and 
feminist political economy analysis and drawing on insights from law and development and 
postcolonial scholarship, it illustrates M-Pesa’s inclusionary regulatory arrangements and 
analyses their implications for gender equality.5 While gender equality, often simplistically 
equated with the number of women with access to financial services, is promoted as a key 
objective of digital financial inclusion, this analysis calls into question the same rhetoric of 
financial inclusion in development discourse. The gender aspect of digital financial inclusion 
is both relevant and revealing, not only because women have predominantly been portrayed 
among the financially excluded for various historical, structural and regulatory reasons, but 
also because an investigation of gender relations can help with recognising and examining the 
social, economic, and legal elements that determine and reproduce financial exclusion.6  
The first section provides an overview of the relationship between gender, development and 
financial inclusion, examining how colonial norms contributed to the financial exclusion of 
women and how the development project has progressively aimed at their ‘conditional’ 
inclusion in the financial system. The analysis traces the shift from microcredit to microfinance 
to digital financial inclusion, highlighting the increasing involvement of the private sector in 
development interventions. The second section discusses the making of M-Pesa’s inclusionary 
infrastructure, focusing on its regulatory arrangements and how these have contributed to 
financial inclusion while expanding the mobile money market to areas typically outside the 
purview of financial markets. The third section examines the articulation of the M-Pesa’s 
                                                        
4 See Muthiora (2015) Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financial Revolution. 
London: GSMA. <https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/resources/enabling-mobile-money-policies-in-
kenya-fostering-a-digital-financial-revolution/ > accessed 30 April 2019; and 
GSMA (2018) Mobile Money Policy and Regulatory Handbook. London: GSMA. 
<https://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/GSMA-Mobile-Money-Policy-
Handbook-2018.pdf > accessed 30 April 2019 
5 As part of the socio-legal enquiry I conducted research in Nairobi, Kenya from November 2012 to January 
2013, and followed this up in 2015. Fieldwork included participant observation; focus groups with M-Pesa users 
in the areas of Kawangware, Ngando and Mathare; and semi-structured interviews with relevant institutions 
including financial institutions, mobile network operators (MNOs) and mobile money-related institutions, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, regulatory institutions and research centres. 
6 According to the 2017 World Bank Global Findex, 56 per cent of those financially excluded are women 




regulatory arrangements and the gender implications of the projects, products and services built 
on its infrastructure. It shows how the M-Pesa platform has been used to provide fee-based and 
debt-based access to fundamental resources and services such as healthcare and electricity, 
often exacerbating gender inequality by charging women with the responsibility for 
transforming the opportunities that M-Pesa offers into improved livelihoods for themselves, 
their households and their communities. 
 
This article argues that although digital financial platforms such as M-Pesa are promoted as 
instruments for economic and social development, they are regulated according to a logic of 
opportunity rather than a politics of redistribution, creating a secure source of profit for the 
institutions involved in the digital financial inclusion business without redistributing the 
income and funding deriving from its development to benefit the financially excluded. While 
the lenient regulation of digital financial platforms can contribute to increasing the number of 
women with access to financial services, its institutional arrangements fail to use M-Pesa’s 
revenue to address the gendered social and economic disadvantages that cause financial 
exclusion in the first place. 
 
Gender, Development and Digital Financial Inclusion 
The law plays an important role in defining the socio-economic conditions that determine both 
financial exclusion and the barriers to accessing financial services. The SDGs encourage 
reforms ‘to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and 
control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural 
resources, in accordance with national laws’ (UN SDG Goal 5A on gender equality).7 The 
World Bank report Women, Business and the Law 2016: Getting to Equal (2015, p. 17) points 
out that law, regulation and policy should facilitate women’s access to credit and other financial 
services as a key factor for gender equality. International organisations including the UN, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well as governments, corporations 
and donors present financial inclusion as a precondition of women’s autonomy and future 
wellbeing that helps them to cope with a lack of resources and unexpected events, engage in 
productive activities and juggle paid and unpaid work (Allon, 2014). In addition to these 
benefits, digital financial platforms have been acclaimed as a way of overcoming the 
                                                        




limitations of cash, increasing women’s security and efficiency and in the long term, improving 
their own, their communities’ and their countries’ wellbeing in line with the Gender Equality 
as Smart Economics narrative (World Bank, 2006, 2012).8  
To understand the nexus between financial inclusion and gender equality in development 
discourse, however, it is important to clarify how the laws and regulations introduced during 
the colonial era created key conditions for gendered financial exclusion. As this article is 
concerned with digital financial inclusion platforms in Kenya, the main focus of analysis is on 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Okeyo (2005) points out that while under colonialism, men and women 
shared a similar subordinate structural position in relation to the dominant Western countries, 
colonial rules had a differential impact on women and men and affected the relationship 
between them. First, the commodification of land and the introduction of property rights 
favoured men, who gained the status of household head (Manji, 2006; Maathai, 2008; Federici, 
2011). Second, the introduction of the wage economy targeted men as paid workers and family 
breadwinners, relegating women to the position of secondary workers (Boserup, 1970; Manji, 
1999; Okeyo, 2005), framing them as dependent on men and mainly responsible for unpaid 
social reproduction work. Social reproduction refers to the social relations, processes and 
labour that go into the daily and generational maintenance of the population (Katz, 2001; 
Picchio, 2003; Bakker and Silvey, 2008), and involves ‘the provision of material resources 
(food, clothing, housing, transport) and the training of individual capabilities necessary for 
interaction in the social context of a particular time and place’ (Picchio, 2003, p. 2). Third, 
customary laws, filtered according to colonial values via the repugnancy clause, facilitated the 
subordination of women in areas such as property rights and domestic and family law, 
including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and land and burial rights (Stamp, 1991; Juma, 2002; 
Banda, 2003; Ocran, 2006).9 Women became adversely affected by customary systems as they 
were not allowed to own or even inherit property and capital, which they needed in order to 
access formal finance (Guyer, 1991). This contributed to their exclusion from the paid 
                                                        
8 The Better than Cash Alliance, a consortium of donors, international organisations, governments, and 
corporations set up in 2012 to adopt measures in support of digital payments, has been particularly influential in 
supporting the digitalisation of cash transactions. See <https://www.betterthancash.org/ > accessed 3 May 2019. 
9 The repugnancy clause was introduced as a method for filtering out any customary law deemed repugnant to 
British culture, which meant that anything found appalling, ridiculous or unhelpful to the inculcation of Western 
ideals could be banned. By introducing the repugnancy clause the British became the arbiters of what was ‘just’ 
and ‘moral’ in African society. Scholars note that the introduction of the concepts of ‘justice’, ‘morality’ and 
‘dignity’ in the advocation of women’s rights in the postcolonial period adopted the same words that some 
colonisers used to define what was non-repugnant. See for instance Banda (2003) Global Standards: Local 




economy and financial services, which in turn resulted in the formation, especially among 
women living on a low income and in rural areas, of self-help groups and rotating credit and 
savings associations (ROSCAs), which are still regarded as a major informal financial practice, 
particularly in the Global South (Ardener and Burman, 1995; Oduol and Kabira, 1995). 
Since Esther Boserup published the UN-commissioned study Women’s Role in Economic 
Development (1970), showing the exclusionary impact of colonial regulations on women for 
the first time, international development institutions have promoted projects and measures for 
the economic inclusion of women. Boserup (1970) showed how the wage economy that 
targeted male workers had disturbed earlier complementarity in food production and household 
management, resulting in the separation of women’s unpaid social reproduction work from 
waged labour and excluding them from not only economic development but also education, 
rights and entitlements. From this perspective the international development project can be 
seen as a process of offering women a variety of conditional opportunities for economic 
inclusion. The idea of conditionality is a very important aspect of this inclusion, as it ties 
economic opportunities to specific disciplinary conditions such as becoming a micro-
entrepreneur or instrumental evaluation of who ‘deserves’ inclusion (Lairap-Fonderson, 2002). 
Access to formal financial services has increasingly become a key instrument of such inclusion. 
This relationship between financial inclusion, gender equality and development can be 
explained by three main shifts: from subsidised lending to microcredit; from microcredit to 
microfinance; and from microfinance to universal financial inclusion.  
In the immediate postcolonial period access to finance seemed a secondary concern to both 
Western and local governments and international financial institutions such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, which tended to view the challenge of economic development as a matter of 
building visible infrastructure such as roads, power plants and canals (Caufield, 1996). 
However, people living on a low and irregular income, particularly women, were already using 
forms of informal finance such as self-help groups, ROSCAs and moneylending practices to 
manage their everyday needs (Geertz, 1962; Bouman and Houtman, 1988; Austin and 
Sugihara, 1993; Ardener and Burman, 1995). Early donor-founded and state-led poverty 
lending programmes provided small farmers, usually male household heads, with subsidised 
credit (Rankin, 2013, p. 553); however, the IMF and World Bank considered this inefficient 




For these reasons the grassroots microcredit experiment started by Muhammad Yunus in 1976 
in Bangladesh, which held borrowers fully accountable for repaying their loans, was soon 
acclaimed (Yunus, 1999). Microcredit, modelled around informal savings and credit schemes 
such as ROSCAs, involves the extension of small collateral-free loans to jointly-liable groups 
of poor women, to be used for income-generating activities mainly in the form of micro-
entrepreneurship.10 This new development credit system marked a shift in approach from state-
subsidised universal access to credit for male-headed households to ‘third-sector microfinance 
institutions targeting poor, rural women as entrepreneurial agents’ (Rankin, 2002, pp. 11–12). 
Microcredit became central to the neoliberal development agenda that introduced the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s with the aim of liberalising and 
globalising former colonies’ economies.11 SAPs contributed to the internationalisation of 
microcredit and various development institutions from non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) to donors and financial institutions incorporated microcredit into their activities. 
However, research has shown that SAPs increased economic and social inequality, with gender 
implications. Their focus on marketisation, cuts to public expenditure and privatisation of 
social services disproportionately affected poor women, increasing their burden of social 
reproduction and forcing them to take informal and insecure jobs (Elson, 1989, 1991a, 1991b; 
Beneria, 2003; Bergeron, 2004; Jaquette and Summerfield, 2006). 
Following criticism of SAPs and adoption of the UN MDGs in 2000 (Rittich, 2006), 
microcredit has increasingly been promoted as an instrument for achieving social goals such 
as poverty reduction and gender equality, and 2005 was proclaimed the International Year of 
Microcredit. The fact that microcredit predominantly targets women and that most borrowers 
are female was initially considered proof that it was a successful project for women’s 
empowerment. However, feminist and critical development scholars have long examined and 
problematised these potential gains, pointing out the patriarchal control over female borrowers 
both in the household and by the microcredit institutions themselves (Goetz, 1996; Rahman, 
1999; Kabeer, 2001); the gendered notion of shame used as a social control mechanism to 
                                                        
10 The typical microcredit contract, referred to as the Grameen model, involves loans to a group of borrowers 
who are liable for each other’s loans. This collective responsibility implies that future loans to all group 
members will be withheld if any borrower has not repaid the previous loan.  
11 The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) represented a package of loans conditional on the adoption of 
neoliberal policies imposed on developing countries by the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s. The policies 
included measures to stabilise, liberalise and globalise economies by lowering barriers to foreign capital, 





ensure repayments (Williams, 2001; Rankin, 2002; Roy, 2015); the risk of creating ever-
expanding cycles of debt (Mayoux, 2002; Taylor, 2012); and development organisations and 
corporations’ appropriation of concepts such as ‘empowerment’ to promote their programmes 
and products (Papart, Rai and Staudt 2002; Cornwall and Rivas 2015: 404). These dynamics 
contributed to what Chant (2008) calls the ‘feminisation of responsibility’: women’s 
disproportionate responsibility for repaying loans through their micro-entrepreneurship 
activities while also looking after their families and communities. 
Interestingly, since the 1990s the term ‘microcredit’ has been gradually replaced by 
‘microfinance’, referring to a broad range of financial products for the poor beyond credit for 
microenterprises and including savings, insurance and payment services (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2010, p. 15). While ‘microcredit’ and ‘microfinance’ are often used interchangeably, 
‘microfinance’ denotes a shift in the approach to financial access. The initial focus of 
microcredit was on poverty reduction and the empowerment of women living in poverty, and 
the key providers were NGOs. With the change in language came a change in orientation 
towards more commercially-oriented, self-sustaining and regulated microfinance institutions 
that function according to financial markets, adopting mainstream financial tools such as credit 
bureaus and credit scoring, and targeting not just poor but also people on a low income 
(Robinson, 2001, p. 22; Johnson, 2012). Although microcredit and microfinance schemes have 
been promoted as more effective ways of achieving poverty reduction, development, and 
gender equality than the previously-available subsidised credit, they remain largely dependent 
on external funding. For this reason the public sector has increasingly partnered with the private 
sector to offer microfinance and other profit-based programmes for gender equality. An 
example of this new focus is the so-called Business Case for Gender Equality framework that 
developed from the mentioned World Bank’s Gender Equality as Smart Economics narrative 
(World Bank 2006, 2012), which advocates gender equality as a valuable instrument of 
economic efficiency and development rather than recognising its intrinsic importance (Chant 
and Sweetman, 2012; Roberts and Soederberg, 2012; Prügl 2016). 
This understanding of gender equality was embraced in the more recent shift towards universal 
financial inclusion in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. In 2009 the G20 leaders 
adopted a global agenda promoting universal financial inclusion as a policy instrument for 
financial stability, economic growth and the realisation of social goals (Soederberg 2013, 
2014). The global financial inclusion agenda has been embraced by globally influential 




Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, as well as 
by emerging institutions in the field such as Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya, the 
Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) representing mobile network operators 
(MNOs), and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) representing regulators in the Global 
South.12 The G20 Principles for Innovative Financial Inclusion were adopted in relation to this 
agenda in 2010.13 It is a non-binding regulatory framework that builds on earlier World Bank 
documents, in particular the policy research report Finance For All (World Bank, 2008).14 The 
agenda and the G20 Principles support the idea of financial innovation through new forms of 
financial service delivery that are capable of reaching the financially excluded via routes such 
as branchless banking and payment services provided by postal and retail outlets in grocery 
stores, pharmacies, kiosks, and petrol stations, among others.15  
M-Pesa in Kenya and mobile money more generally have become examples of financial 
innovation supporting the objective of extending and facilitating access to finance to those who 
are excluded or under-served by mainstream financial institutions. Gender equality has become 
a key mobile money policy objective, and M-Pesa is often extolled as a successful example in 
this regard.16 As discussed below, this understanding of financial innovation focuses on 
                                                        
12 GSMA is an association of mobile operators that plays an important role in the regulation of mobile money by 
providing studies, analysis and even training to mobile money providers and regulators to address regulatory 
barriers and develop an ‘enabling environment’ for mobile money. GSMA has also a programme to ‘accelerate 
the digital and financial inclusion of women’ which focuses on eliminating barriers to accessing finance by 
promoting the ‘business case for gender equality’ mentioned earlier. 
AFI constitutes a network of policymakers and regulators from 90 countries in the Global South and was 
established in 2008 with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It became an independent 
international organisation in 2016. As stated in the Maya Declaration adopted in 2011, AFI is committed to 
realising financial inclusion strategies in partnership with private-sector actors, implementing an innovative 
regulatory framework for financial inclusion and realising social goals such as gender equality. M-Pesa has 
played a role in defining the scope of AFI policy and its institutional structure. Njuguna Ndung’u, the Governor 
of the CBK during the development of M-Pesa from 2007 to 2015, was also the first chair of the AFI. The first 
AFI Global Policy Forum was held in Nairobi in 2009. 
13 G20 Innovative Financial Inclusion Expert Group, Innovative Financial Inclusion: Principles and Report on 
Innovative Financial Inclusion, 2010. < https://www.gpfi.org/publications/principles-and-report-innovative-
financial-inclusion > accessed 2 May 2019 
14 According to Johnson (2012), the World Bank Finance for All report (2008) marks the shift from microcredit 
and microfinance for poverty reduction to the wider aim of financial sector and financial market development. 
15 G20, Principles on Innovative Financial Inclusion, Principle 3: Innovation. 
16 Gender Equality is a key development objective (Goal 5, UN Sustainable Development Goals) and for this 
reason has been embraced by the institutions supporting the digital financial inclusion agenda. The Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation’s Gender Equality Strategy sees the opportunities offered by mobile money services 
such as M-Pesa as contributing to gender equality,  see < https://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-
Do/Global-Growth-and-Opportunity/Gender-Equality > accessed 10 August 2019. Similarly GSMA has a 




removing barriers, including regulatory barriers, and increasing the number of people able to 
access financial services, rather than using new financial platforms and the revenue and funding 
deriving from them to redistribute wealth and support the welfare of financially excluded 
groups to enable them to take advantage of financial inclusion.  
 
The Inclusionary Regulation of Digital Financial Platforms: The Case of M-
Pesa in Kenya 
The idea of M-Pesa originated from the grassroots practice of transferring prepaid airtime 
following the rapid spread of mobile phones in Africa, but the development of its platform 
relied on inclusionary institutional, infrastructural and regulatory arrangements. This section 
illustrates these arrangements and how they contributed to the rapid expansion of the M-Pesa 
system, defining its success as a digital financial inclusion project. The analysis shows that M-
Pesa, unlike microcredit programmes, does not specifically target women and its regulation is 
ostensibly gender-neutral. However, the context, structures and relations within which the M-
Pesa platform has been developed and regulated are very much gendered. M-Pesa is the only 
financial service that many women living on a low and irregular income can afford and they 
integrate it into their informal financial practices, micro-businesses and social networks 
(Kusimba, Krunyu, Gross, 2018).  
The institutionalisation of M-Pesa was the result of a public-private partnership between 
Vodafone and DFID involving Vodafone’s partner in Kenya, Safaricom, and various local and 
international institutions such as the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), financial institutions, tech 
companies, regulators and development actors. DFID, the UK government sector that manages 
aid and funds international development research and projects, contributed to M-Pesa via the 
Financial Deepening Challenge Fund (FDCF).17 The fund was designed in the late 1990s to 
contribute to the realisation of the MDGs via private-sector involvement in the provision of 
innovative and commercially-viable financial services to people living in poverty and on a low 
                                                        
women/ > accessed 29 August 2019; and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion has adopted the Denarau 
Programme, aimed at bridging the gender gap in access to financial services AFI Gender Inclusive Finance < 
https://www.afi-global.org/gender-women-financial-inclusion > accessed 29 August 2019.  
17 The 2002 International Development Act replaced the 1980 Overseas Development and Cooperation Act 
(which itself had replaced the 1929 Colonial Development Act) and made poverty alleviation and the 




income, in particular the ‘economically active poor’. The scheme defined innovation as the 
creation of a product or service not available to the target market, or the application of a 
technology that reduces the costs of financial services, in this way increasing access to finance 
(Hughes and Lonie, 2007). At about the same time DFID initiated another project supporting 
financial inclusion in Africa: Financial Sector Deepening Trusts (FSD). The first and most 
relevant FSD was established in Kenya in 2005 and aimed to build retail capacity and 
competition in the financial sector, develop various support services and address the 
institutional regulatory and supervisory environment to balance financial inclusion and security 
issues (Johnson and Williams, 2013). Besides these projects focusing specifically on financial 
inclusion, from 2001 DFID funded a series of studies in Africa investigating the relationship 
between new information technology and poverty reduction which revealed the potential for 
using the mobile phone network infrastructure to facilitate financial transactions (McKemey et 
al., 2003; Batchelor, 2005). 
At the 2003 World Summit for Sustainable Development, the UK-based multinational 
corporation Vodafone, in particular its Social Enterprise department headed by Nick Hughes, 
was interested in collaborating with the public sector on a long-term development project that 
could combine profit with social objectives in line with the idea of social entrepreneurship 
(Nicholls, 2006). According to Hughes, many technology-based companies such as Vodafone 
were focusing on developing the technology rather than expanding the market, and public-
private partnerships could circumvent this (Hughes and Lonie, 2007). Vodafone was awarded 
a DFID Financial Deepening Challenge Fund of 1 million GBP which it matched with a 
combination of cash and staff time, to develop a project using mobile phone infrastructure to 
facilitate and expand the reach of financial services. The project aimed to fill a niche in the 
market by serving those with no access to formal financial services, and in this way 
contributing to the MDGs (Hughes and Lonie, 2007). The area of interest for the 
implementation of the project was East Africa, a FDCF target zone, and Kenya seemed a likely 
option as both DFID and Vodafone already had a relevant presence in the country. Safaricom, 
which is 40 per cent owned by Vodafone, had a 75 per cent share of the mobile phone market 
in Kenya at the time and a strong brand presence (Owino and Tanui, 2011). Local institutions, 
in particular the CBK, expressed their willingness to collaborate on the project to develop a 
mobile money service which was named M-Pesa (M for mobile, pesa, Swahili for money). 
The development of the M-Pesa platform relied on institutional arrangements between local, 




a UK consultancy firm based in Cambridge, to develop the software. Many of the available 
financial service platforms had been designed for integration with Western banking 
infrastructures and could only provide an additive banking approach, for example by adding 
new channels via which customers could access their bank accounts. However, M-Pesa was 
intended not as a banking service but as an MNO-based service outside the banking 
infrastructure, so its functionality needed to be integrated with MNO products and services 
(Wooder and Baker, 2012). The software was developed around the well-known and widely-
available SMS technology so that the system could be used on basic black-and-white mobile 
phones. M-Pesa was situated on the SIM card and linked to the mobile number, and the system 
was designed in both English and Swahili to facilitate the inclusion of people living in the rural 
areas and speaking mainly Swahili.  
The M-Pesa service facilitated payments by allowing the conversion of cash into electronic 
money (e-money); the transfer of e-money to other users, whether people or institutions, for 
which the payer would pay a fee proportionate to the amount transferred; and the conversion 
of e-money back into cash, for which the payee would pay a fee. To do this DFID and Vodafone 
used Safaricom’s well-established network of airtime dealer outlets as mobile money agents 
where consumers could go to open an M-Pesa account and convert cash into e-money and vice 
versa. M-Pesa agents were provided with a mobile phone and an agent’s M-Pesa menu that 
enabled them to register customers and manage their own M-Pesa agent account. They acted 
as cash merchants, managing their own liquidity as agents and meeting customers’ requests. 
DFID, Vodafone and Safaricom decided to hold M-Pesa’s money in a trust account at the 
Commercial Bank of Africa, managed by the M-Pesa Holding Company.18  
While Vodafone and DFID initially saw M-Pesa as a system to facilitate microfinance 
transactions, following a pilot to test its functionality they decided to promote it as a low-cost 
payment platform on which they would create a range of different services and products for all 
Kenyans, with particular potential for those with no access to other formal financial services. 
At the time of the pilot mobile money was unregulated, so CBK opted for a ‘test and learn’ 
approach.19 This meant that while various audits were conducted to make sure that M-Pesa 
complied with international anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing 
                                                        
18 Declaration of Trust, M-Pesa Holding Co Limited, 23rd February 2007.  
19 This term was used by Njuguna Ngundu, governor of the Central Bank of Kenya from 2007 to 2015. See 





(CTF) laws, CBK supervised the service in partnership with the MNO, maintaining an 
openness to new financial services and providers.20 The CBK allowed Safaricom to operate 
under a special licence from the Communications Commission of Kenya, dispensing with the 
need for a banking licence, and the Communications Act 1998 was amended in 2009 to 
recognise electronic transactions.21 This demonstrates how M-Pesa was created at the 
intersection between telecommunications and finance,  with the CBK and the Communications 
Commission of Kenya collaborating over its regulation.22 
After conducting various legal and risk assessments and authorising two external audits, the 
CBK issued Safaricom with a Letter of No Objection (Muthiora, 2015, p. 11). The letter 
represented M-Pesa’s regulatory framework from 2007 to 2014, when the National Payment 
System (NPS) Regulations were adopted by the National Treasury.23 This regulatory 
framework aimed to ensure the system’s integrity and security and to validate the ‘social’ 
mobile money business model and favoured its expansion (Muthiora, 2015, p. 20). The NPS 
Regulations, which codify the regulatory practices adopted by the CBK, have also contributed 
to expanding the mobile money system by allowing both banks and non-banks to provide 
mobile money services and mobile money providers to offer a variety of e-money products and 
services.  
All of these institutional arrangements facilitated access to the service and the expansion of the 
mobile money market. According to a survey by Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya in 
2006, just before the launch of M-Pesa, repeated in following years, the number of people with 
access to formal finance increased from 20 per cent in 2006 to 80 per cent in 2019 (FDS 2007, 
2009, 2013, 2016, 2019), and the number of people using only informal financial methods 
decreased from 32 per cent in 2006 to 6 per cent in 2019 (FSD, 2007; 2019). The number of 
women and men using formal financial services increased from 20.5 and 33.2 per cent in 2006 
to 70.7 and 79.7 per cent in 2016 respectively. The lenient regulation of mobile money has 
allowed people to integrate the M-Pesa platform with their informal practices easily, 
                                                        
20 See Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Case Study: Enabling Mobile Money Transfers: The Central Bank of 
Kenya’s Treatment of M-Pesa, 2010 < https://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/publications/afi_casestudy_mpesa_en.pdf > accessed 2 May 2019. 
21 Laws of Kenya, The Kenya Information and Communication Act 1998, Chapter 411 A. Rev. 2011. Electronic 
transactions Part VI A. 
22 On this point see Houpis and Bellis (2007) The Regulatory Implications of Mobile and Financial Services 
Convergence in The Transformational Potential of M-Transactions: Moving the Debate Forward, Policy Paper 
Series No. 6. London: Vodafone Group PLC. 





contributing to the expansion of the mobile money market. Women in particular have started 
using M-Pesa as part of informal financial groups such as ROSCAs, using the service to store 
money and make payments to group members.24  
While the increase in the number of female customers has been used to frame M-Pesa and its 
regulatory approach as successful in terms of gender equality (see Suri and Jack, 2016, whose 
study has been embraced by the Gates Foundation, GSMA, AFI and other organisations 
supporting the digital financial inclusion agenda), no attention has been paid to the gendered 
causes of financial exclusion and their implications. These causes, also mentioned in the 2006 
survey (FSD, 2007), include lack of income (58.9 per cent) and lack of regular income (31.6 
per cent). The 2016 survey shows that the main reason for stopping using a bank account was 
loss of income source (39.4 per cent), and the World Bank’s 2017 Global Findex data (World 
Bank, 2018), shows a clear link between access to finance and regular income. None of these 
surveys provide data on the gender-related reasons behind financial exclusion.  
This section has shown how the regulation of M-Pesa has been instrumental in eliminating 
barriers to accessing and using the service, and how it has focused on expansion rather than the 
causes of exclusion. As discussed in the first part of this article, these causes and their gendered 
implications have been shaped by colonial regulation and development policies. Without 
clearly recognising this legacy, current global financial inclusion policies call for the removal 
of legal barriers to accessing digital financial services as the key to gender equality (World 
Bank, 2015). Interestingly the World Bank’s 2017 Global Findex (2018, p. 25) states that men 
are more likely to own a bank account and women to have a mobile money account, presenting 
mobile money services as an opportunity for women without questioning the gendered 
structural inequalities that limit their access to mainstream banking. This approach has framed 
digital financial inclusion policies as aiming to create an enabling environment for the 
expansion of financial platforms and the market opportunities deriving from them (Gabor and 
Brooks, 2017: 11), without considering the adoption of measures to address the gendered socio-
economic disadvantages that cause financial exclusion.  
The next section analyses some of the problematic aspects of promoting mobile money services 
as opportunities for gender equality.  
 
                                                        
24 Focus groups: Kawangware, Nairobi, 29 November 2012; Mathare, Nairobi, 4 December 2012; Ngando, 




The Exclusionary Implications of Inclusionary Regulations: Logic of 
Opportunity v. Politics of Redistribution  
The increase in the number of women with access to digital financial services has been 
promoted as a positive outcome in terms of gender equality. The ‘test and learn’ approach to 
the regulation of mobile money services is seen as instrumental in facilitating this aim, with 
international institutions such as the UN, the IMF and the World Bank as well as emerging 
regulatory and policy actors in the area of digital financial inclusion such as GSMA and AFI 
considering M-Pesa an example of good regulatory practice. This section looks at the gender 
implications of the inclusionary regulation of M-Pesa, more specifically examining whether 
this regulatory approach can contribute to creating an environment that not only enables access 
to financial services but also challenges unequal gender relations. As Elson argues, a gender-
equitable system would require the sphere of finance to serve the needs of social provisioning 
and support social reproduction work, which is disproportionately women’s responsibility 
(Elson, 2014). It is important to mention in this regard that while social reproduction work is 
recognised in the SDGs in relation to gender equality, there is no discussion in international 
development policies of possible measures to address women’s unsustainable burden of unpaid 
work or to favour its fairer distribution in society.25  
Two main and related aspects of the regulation of M-Pesa are relevant to this analysis: the first 
is that M-Pesa is regulated as a payment system and not as a banking service; the second is 
how the ‘test and learn’ approach to regulation allowed Safaricom to create partnerships with 
public and private-sector institutions to develop a variety of socially-relevant products and 
services on the M-Pesa platform. Maurer (2012, p. 303) considers regulation in the field of 
mobile money ‘retrospective ethnography of potential’ rather than ‘proscriptive or restrictive 
of human action’. This means that mobile money regulation offers an account of the past by 
considering the obstacles to accessing financial services; it is responsive to the present by 
adopting a ‘test and learn’ approach; and it keeps an eye to the future with a view to a particular 
aim, which in the case of M-Pesa is both financial inclusion and the expansion of the mobile 
money market. 
                                                        
25 The value of unpaid work is also recognised in the SDG on gender equality: Goal (5.4) states that it will 
‘Recognise and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public services, infrastructure and 
social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as 




The CBK decided that the Kenya Banking Act did not provide a legal basis for either M-Pesa 
or the regulation of the mobile money products offered by MNOs. Mobile money providers are 
not classed as financial intermediaries, and mobile money services are not banking businesses 
as specified in the Kenyan Banking Act. A banking business involves not only accepting 
money from the public but also ‘the employing of money held on deposit on current accounts, 
or any part of the money, by lending, investment or in any manner for the account and at the 
risk of the person so employing the money.’26 The M-Pesa system is rather designed to provide 
a money transfer service converting cash into e-money and e-money into cash through mobile 
money agents acting as cash merchants. These transactions are managed via the mobile phone 
and are reflected in the customer’s mobile money wallet. Customers depositing money in their 
M-Pesa account purchase electronic units for cash, which can be transferred or withdrawn for 
a fee.  
M-Pesa customers remain in control of their electronic money at all times. There is no financial 
intermediation in banking terms between M-Pesa customers and the mobile money agents. The 
agents do not perform bank credit assessments or risk management as deposit-taking banking 
institutions do: they simply exchange cash for electronic money and vice-versa. The money is 
physically kept in pooled trust accounts at the Commercial Bank of Kenya and other banks in 
the custody of a trustee, the non-profit M-Pesa Holding Company.27 The use of trust accounts 
also means that M-Pesa customers are not paid interest on money kept in their M-Pesa account. 
Even if customers see keeping money in the M-Pesa account as saving, this is not the case from 
a regulatory perspective, as the CBK has been very careful to make clear from the outset. While 
mainstream banking terms such as ‘withdrawals’ and ‘deposits’ are used in M-Pesa 
transactions, in practice customers are just exchanging cash for e-money, and transferring e-
money on payment of a fee.  
The fee itself has an important regulatory role in defining access and facilitating the expansion 
of the service. The fees for each transaction are taken directly from the customer’s account, 
making each transaction profitable for the MNO on a stand-alone basis. There is no charge for 
signing up to M-Pesa or for converting cash into e-money (i.e. depositing money), and the 
charge for transferring e-money and converting it back into cash (i.e. withdrawing money) 
                                                        
26 Laws of Kenya, Banking Act 1989 (as amended 15th September 2015), Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. Part I 
section 2(C). 
27 As the size of the M-Pesa Trust account grew, after consultation with CBK the trustee decided to spread the 
funds across several banks to reduce the risk of having a single custodial bank and of corruption (see Muthiora, 




depends on the amount and whether the recipient is registered with M-Pesa.28 The different 
fees for registered and unregistered customers were initially adopted to facilitate the expansion 
of the service: M-Pesa customers could send money to anybody in Kenya who had a mobile 
phone, whether or not they subscribed to M-Pesa, but the fee for transferring money to 
unregistered customers was much higher than that for registered users.29 Research shows that 
M-Pesa users persuaded their relatives and friends to sign up to M-Pesa to avoid the higher 
transfer fee (Mas and Radcliff, 2010, p. 15). This difference has been reduced with various 
progressive changes to the fee structure which reflect the expansion of the M-Pesa system, and 
the mobile money market more generally. 
The regulation of M-Pesa as a payment system also means that while the MNO, Safaricom, 
receives a secure source of profit via the fees, customers cannot make decisions about interest 
earned by their M-Pesa funds kept in the trust accounts. According to the NPS Regulations 
‘any income generated from placement of these trust funds shall be used in accordance with 
Trust legislation and in consultation with the Bank [or] donated to public charitable 
organisations for use for public charitable purposes.’30 Interest on customers’ deposits is 
managed by the M-Pesa Holding Company, which claim that the M-Pesa Foundation, an 
independent charitable trust created in 2010 for this purpose, administer it in the interests of all 
Kenyans.31 Projects funded by the M-Pesa Foundation rely on partnerships between Safaricom, 
donors, local and international institutions, and the private sector to combine mobile 
technology and social objectives such as education, healthcare, gender equality and 
environmental protection according to the logic of social entrepreneurship, namely making a 
profit while promoting social good.  
                                                        
28 Fees for money transfers currently range from 11 KES to send 101–500 KES to 77 KES to send 5,001–7,500 
KES and 105 KES to send 20,001–70,000 KES, which is the maximum amount that can be transferred.28 With 
the latest changes to the fees structure there is no fee for transferring 1-100 KES, but it costs 10 KES to 
withdraw 50–100 KES, with a minimum withdrawal of 50 KES. (1 KES = 0,0099 USD. The full list of M-Pesa 
charges is available here < https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/getting-started/m-pesa-rates > 
accessed 2 May 2019.  
29 When M-Pesa was launched it cost 30 KES to send 20,000 KES to an M-Pesa-registered user and 350 KES to 
send the same amount to an unregistered recipient; now it costs 102 and 288 KES respectively, and 303 KES to 
send 20,001-25,001 KES to an unregistered user.  
30 The National Payment System Regulations 2014, Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 119, Legislative Supplement 
no. 43, section 25.5. 
31 M-Pesa Holding Co Limited Declaration of Trust 
<https://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Personal/M-




A number of projects supported by the Foundation use mobile money services to achieve social 
objectives such as maternal health. Uzazi Salama (safe motherhood), for example, is a 
programme realised through a partnership between the M-Pesa Foundation, Amref Health 
Africa, the PharmAccess Foundation and the Samburu County government to create a more 
efficient transport and referral system for maternal healthcare. A similar scheme, the Health 
Enablement and Learning Platform (HELP), is a mobile phone-enabled learning programme 
realised via a partnership between the M-Pesa Foundation, Amref, Kenya’s Ministry of Health, 
and Accenture Development Partnerships in three locations in Kenya: Nairobi’s Kibera slum, 
the rural district of Mwingi, and the Samburu pastoralist region. It provides volunteers with 
mobile-phone-based training after which they are responsible for passing on health-related 
information to community members and providing support in emergencies.32  
The ‘test and learn’ approach to the regulation of mobile money has allowed Safaricom to 
collaborate with financial institutions, corporations and donors and to rely on mobile data to 
develop a variety of mobile-money-enabled products and services targeting the ‘unbanked’ and 
poor and low-income consumers in particular (Maurer, 2015; Gabor and Brooks, 2017). 
Michael Joseph, former Safaricom CEO, refers to this practice as the ‘McDonald’s strategy’ or 
the ‘Coca-Cola strategy’, emphasising the potential for M-Pesa’s mass penetration through 
partnerships and the proliferation of mobile money products and services (Omwansa and 
Sullivan, 2012, p. 24). This approach seems to have guided the development of M-Pesa as a 
digital financial inclusion platform.  
Safaricom has concluded agreements with microfinance institutions and banks to integrate their 
credit, savings and insurance products with the M-Pesa platform. Among other attempts to 
facilitate access to formal financial services such as credit and savings, in 2012 Safaricom and 
the Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) launched M-Shwari (shwari is the Swahili word for 
calm), a banking service that has developed savings and credit products by emulating the ways 
in which people use M-Pesa. It allows M-Pesa users to open a free savings account directly 
from their mobile phone without requirements such as a minimum deposit or credit history, 
and offers low-value (100–50,000 KES), fee-based (7.5% facilitation fee), short-term loans (30 
days) (Cook and McKay, 2015). Approval of a loan is an automated procedure based on credit-
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scoring rules that use the applicant’s airtime and M-Pesa transaction record, and risks 
reproducing negative patterns of microcredit such as over-indebtedness (Bateman et al.. 2019). 
Besides financial services, Safaricom has concluded multi-institutional agreements to create 
fee-based products and services providing access to needed services such as healthcare and 
electricity. Some of these projects are provided in collaboration with philanthropic foundations, 
similar to those funded by the M-Pesa Foundation, while others allow users to buy products 
and services on credit, repaying the debt in small and flexible instalments via the M-Pesa 
platform. There are numerous mobile money services, and numerous possibilities for the 
development of new ones. 
Some schemes specifically target women in their biological reproductive role, including 
FistulaCare, which facilitates the treatment of women with fistula. FistulaCare is provided by 
the Freedom from Fistula Foundation (FFF), founded by the millionaire businesswoman and 
philanthropist Ann Gloag in 2008. Women can call the FFF hotline and can receive treatment 
at the Jamaa Mission Hospital in Nairobi. If a woman cannot afford transport to the hospital 
FFF can send them the fare via M-Pesa, with an additional 25 KES (about 0.30 USD) to cover 
the transaction fee.33 However, the Foundation advertises only the free fistula treatment and 
not the fare to the hospital, in order to avoid ‘women who have the ability to pay using project 
funds’, which prevents some women who could benefit from it contacting the FFF.34 A similar 
project in Tanzania via a collaboration between the Comprehensive Community-Based 
Rehabilitation Hospital and the UN Populations Fund (UNFPA) works through intermediaries 
called community ambassadors, who receive a small payment for identifying women with 
fistula and liaising with the hospital. The hospital determines which women are suitable for the 
programme and can send them the fare to hospital via M-Pesa.  
An example of a credit-based product that is repaid via M-Pesa is M-Kopa (kopa’, ‘to borrow’ 
in Swahili), founded in 2011 by Nick Hugh, the former head of social enterprise at Vodafone 
who started M-Pesa. M-Kopa is a micro-solar system consisting of a base station with a solar 
panel, three lamps and a charging kit for mobile phones. It was developed via a partnership 
between Safaricom, entrepreneurs, developers, and donors, initially the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, DFID and the Shell Foundation, which were later joined by other multinational 
                                                        
33 The M-Pesa fee is 10 KES to withdraw 50-100 KSH.  
34 FistulaCare project: 
 <http://www.fistulacare.org/pages/pdf/technical-briefs/mobile_phone_brief_updated4.5.2011.pdf > accessed 2 




corporations including Mitsui. The donors and companies provide initial funding for producing 
the system, which is offered to customers on credit basis. Customers pay about 18,999 KES 
(about 186 USD) for the system, which includes a deposit of 2,999 KES (about 30 USD) and 
daily payments of 50 KES (about 0.50 USD) for a year via M-Pesa or, more recently, other 
mobile money systems.35 Customers can use the solar system for as long as they keep up their 
payments, and when the repayment is complete after a year they own it. M-Kopa offers other 
products on credit such as rainwater tanks, smartphones and televisions, as well as loans for 
school fees, with small, flexible repayments.  
These examples show the numerous products and services that can be built on the M-Pesa 
platform. As a financial inclusion project, all of M-Pesa’s products and services are tied to this 
main objective, underlining access to finance as instrumental to the achievement of social 
objectives such as poverty reduction and gender equality. Mobile money has made access to 
basic resources and services conditional on access to finance via small credit systems such as 
M-Shwari and mobile-money-enabled projects.36 As many mobile-money projects and 
products target women directly in their biological reproductive role or indirectly in their social 
reproductive role, this has automatically contributed to increasing the number of women 
‘included’ in the financial system by offering them products and services that they and their 
household desperately need and which are not publicly available. While these projects are 
appealing and can be considered useful in the absence of other forms of access, not everyone 
at the lower end of the income distribution can access or successfully use mobile-money-
enabled programmes, not only because they need a mobile phone and an M-Pesa account but 
also due to other limitations. There is often a lack of information about eligibility for the M-
Pesa Foundation and other donors’ maternal health programmes, for instance. and they are 
often limited to particular areas depending on the individual partnership and the partners’ 
interests.37 In the case of fee-based products and services which could be used to support social 
reproduction work the main obstacle is the initial deposit and the commitment to pay daily or 
                                                        
35 According to current M-Pesa charges, M-Pesa users pay a fee of 56 KES to transfer 2,999 KES (to both M-
Pesa or other mobile money users), but the transfer of 50 KES is free. Initially, customers had to pay between 1 
and 3 KES to transfer up to 100 KES to other M-Pesa users, including companies. See < 
https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/getting-started/m-pesa-rates > accessed 2 May 2019 
36 According to a 2018 study on the impact of M-Shwari, users at the lower end of the income distribution use 
M-Shwari loans to pay for basic services such as school fees and for emergencies rather than for consumption 
goods or productive assets. Also, these loans do not reduce the likelihood of borrowing from informal sources. 
See Suri and Gubbins (2018) How is Digital Credit Changing the Life of Kenyans? Evidence from an 
Evaluation of the Impact of M-Shwari. Nairobi: FSD Research Brief. 




weekly.38 These services are meant to give people both an opportunity and the responsibility 
for taking advantage of products and services that could help them to improve their lives: for 
instance the M-Kopa solar power kit is promoted as an opportunity for the poor to study and 
work, holding the users themselves responsible for translating this into ‘success’.  
While the products and services arranged through the M-Pesa infrastructure aim to facilitate 
the achievement of social goals, they usually reconceptualise public goods and necessary 
resources as for-profit enterprises, transforming basic needs into market opportunities 
purchasable through mobile financial services facilitated by Safaricom. As basic resources and 
services are sold through the M-Pesa infrastructure they become marketised and financialised, 
and users’ livelihoods become dependent on the market and integration into financial circuits. 
Resources are often bought on credit or through savings schemes and repaid in small and/or 
flexible instalments that, depending on the amount, include a fee to the MNO for each 
transaction. As Ribot and Peluso argue in A Theory of Access (2003), fees regulate forms of 
decentralised and marketised access and limit the achievement of the socio-economic rights of 
poorer people.39 In the mobile money system basic needs such as access to water and healthcare 
are promoted as social objectives enabled by what Gabor and Brooks (2017, p. 2) call the 
fintech-philanthropy-development complex rather than as socio-economic rights provided by 
the state. This form of blended financing for development (Tan, 2018) results in a lack of 
accountability for delivering social objectives in ways that do not challenge or even exacerbate 
the inequalities they are supposed to address, and fail to realise decent standards of living for 
all people (Kabeer, 2015).  
Mobile money products and services can appear to generate emancipatory effects by creating 
opportunities for greater financial inclusion, helping poor households access resources that 
provide material input for social provisioning and access to social services. These 
individualised and marketised forms of access, however, reproduce divisions and inequalities 
among the population and impose new burdens on poorer women, who are disproportionately 
responsible for social reproduction work (Molyneux, 2006; Roberts, 2015) The increased 
                                                        
38 Focus groups in Kawangware, 28 November 2012 and Ngando, 8 December 2012.  
39 These include the right to food, water, shelter, education, health and employment, and are by definition more 
substantive than political and civil rights; they need to be translated into social protection, infrastructure, 
services and other measures that have an actual impact on people’s lives. Socio-economic rights are also 
gendered, as they are shaped by the gendered nature of social institutions, including the legal factors that have 
limited women’s access to property, land and capital and which, as discussed, can be traced back to the colonial 




responsibility is presented not as such but as an opportunity that comes with access to finance 
through M-Pesa. The opportunity to gain autonomy, independence and equality via mobile 
money platforms is limited by gendered structural inequalities been shaped by colonial history 
and postcolonial development policies. This exposes a general problem of financial inclusion 
as a development strategy for gender equality: the potential benefits can very easily become 
burdens when strategies to enhance women’s access to resources simply increase the load they 
bear and the number of demands upon them. This depends on the fact that such initiatives 
create opportunities for women living in poverty or on a low income without providing them 
with the resources and social infrastructure necessary to take advantage of such opportunities 
(Kabeer, 2015).  
While M-Pesa and all the projects and services provided via the mobile money platform 
represent a secure source of income for the MNO, the profits and funding deriving from M-
Pesa are not redistributed to benefit the financially excluded. As Bateman et al. (2019) observe, 
considering that Safaricom is owned 40 per cent by Vodafone and 25 per cent by investors, 
leaving only 35 per cent owned by the Kenyan government,40 this means that a relevant 
proportion of the revenue M-Pesa produces is not locally redistributed but rather repatriated 
back to shareholders in the UK and other countries in a form of neo-colonial digital extraction 
(Bateman et al., 2019, pp. 7–8).  
This article argues that M-Pesa is regulated according to a logic of opportunity rather than a 
politics of redistribution. The idea of opportunity tends not only to ignore past and present 
political, economic and legal dynamics that have shaped gendered forms of inequality and 
exclusion but also risk furthering unequal gender relations. According to Ferguson (2015), 
major social problems such as poverty and inequality can be considered fundamentally 
distributive issues, and for this reason distribution should be central to political decisions and 
regulatory measures. Ferguson (ibid, p. 36) argues that to reduce inequality the world must 
redistribute the existing wealth based not on market logics or charitable giving, which would 
reproduce asymmetric power relations, but on the idea that people are entitled to a rightful 
share of the global wealth.  
                                                        
40 In 2008, after the rapid growth of M-Pesa the Kenyan government sold 25 per cent of Safaricom shares, now 





A politics of redistribution, differently from a logic of opportunity, takes the view that people 
are entitled to a fairer distribution of resources such as food, water, land, money, information 
and technology; of responsibilities; and of the power that influences discourses, agendas and 
decisions. This is different from the de-contextualised and de-politicised neoliberal idea of 
accepting the inequality deriving from economic growth with the promise that it will be 
redistributed through market opportunities or aid programmes (Ferguson, 2006, 2015). In the 
case of digital financial platforms, redistributive measures would allow the financially 
excluded living on a low and irregular income to take full and fair advantage of financial 
services. Redistribution also has important implications for gender relations in terms of 
alleviating women’s burden of social reproduction work. Possible redistributive measures 
could include the use of M-Pesa’s profits, the interest generated by the M-Pesa trust accounts, 
or philanthropic foundations’ funding to directly fund collective necessities such as water, 
healthcare and education via publicly-accessible services and social assistance. Such measures 
would contribute to addressing women’s disproportionate responsibility for social reproduction 
and would have a greater impact on unequal gender relations, particularly at the lower end of 
the income distribution.  
 
Conclusion 
Kenya’s M-Pesa has been acclaimed by international organisations, governments, financial 
institutions, private-sector actors, philanthropic foundations and regulators as a successful 
digital platform for financial inclusion that is contributing to the achievement of development 
goals such as gender equality. A key aspect of its success has been attributed to its inclusionary 
regulation, which has facilitated access to financial services for those excluded from 
mainstream banking, complying with international security requirements while maintaining an 
openness to new mobile money products and providers. Bridging feminist political economy 
analysis and socio-legal enquiry and borrowing insights from law and development and 
postcolonial literature, this paper has called into question the success of M-Pesa from a gender 
perspective. After illustrating how the nexus between gender and financial inclusion has been 
shaped by colonial rules and development interventions, it has examined M-Pesa’s regulatory 
arrangements and the gender implications of the projects, products and services these facilitate. 
This paper concludes that while M-Pesa has increased the number of women able to access 




at the lower end of the income distribution, mainly due to a lack of corresponding redistributive 
measures addressing the gendered socio-economic inequalities that have caused and reproduce 
financial exclusion. The increasing revenue deriving from M-Pesa, to which women living in 
poverty and on a low income contribute greatly, is not distributed to them; however, possible 
rewards are offered in the form of opportunities, leaving them with the responsibility for and 
risks inherent in taking advantage of these opportunities. As mentioned above, possible 
redistributive measures could include unconditional public access to healthcare, electricity and 
other necessary services rather than fee- and debt-based services.  
A main problem with seeing digital financial platforms such as M-Pesa as a successful 
development strategy for gender equality resides in the same idea of inclusion. Inclusive 
initiatives are built on existing inequalities: the structures of exclusion that have shaped socio-
economic relations since the colonial era are reshaped by a logic of inclusion that risks 
reproducing them. As Spivak (1993, p. 46) says, strategies that secure greater inclusion for 
women and disadvantaged groups are things ‘one cannot not want’. What is ambivalent, 
however, is their inclusion in a social, political and economic order originally founded on their 
exclusion. The rhetoric of inclusion has often been used to reframe rather than challenge 
problematic development discourses and measures such as those concerned with gender 
equality (Cornwall and Rivas, 2015).  
The progressive expansion of the development framework to include social goals has resulted 
in the promotion of financial services as useful or even necessary for the achievement of goals 
such as poverty reduction and gender equality. The same idea of the ‘unbanked poor’ coined 
by international financial institutions suggests a nexus between financial exclusion and the 
perpetuation of poverty. This has also resulted in the legitimisation of a variety of development 
agents’ provision of socially relevant financial products and services without holding them 
accountable for delivering social objectives in ways that reproduce instead of challenging 
inequalities (Adams and Pingeot, 2013; Blowfield and Doloman, 2014; Kabeer, 2015). The 
responsibility for creating ‘development’ has been increasingly shifted to individuals, 
increasing women’s social reproduction burden (Roberts and Soederberg, 2013). 
Development measures and projects tackling exclusion tend to focus on products and services 
that can include poorer consumers rather than on the ‘inequalities in power and voice that keep 
poor populations systematically, socially and politically excluded’ (Banks and Hulme, 2014, 
p. 192). This understanding of exclusion simplifies regulation, policy and the calculation of 




maldistribution of wealth and its gender implications, the entitlement of all people to a decent 
livelihood, and the global and local public obligation to ensure this. Digital financial inclusion 
has become a quick fix for all issues relating to gender inequality, with gender equality often 
reduced to a simple, measurable and even profitable goal that can be achieved without 
challenging unequal power structures and relations. While the regulation of mobile money has 
favoured the expansion of the M-Pesa platform to include more women in the financial system, 
it has not contributed to the redistribution of the power, resources and gendered responsibilities 
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